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SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN AN AGE OF TERROR

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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ABSTRACT

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The US has a wide range of tools at its disposal to cement foreign cooperative relationships. However, none are more relevant or useful than the Security Assistance program. I believe this program is the linchpin to garnering foreign support for the US led war on terror. The various elements of this program can effectively tilt neutral nations toward the US and strengthen relationships with nations that are already friendly toward the US. It is a program that furthers US strategic interests by promoting democratic values, human rights, diplomatic and military partnerships, regional stability, interoperability and access into previously inaccessible locales. Additionally, Security Assistance can dissuade our enemies from taking aggressive military actions. Fighting the war on terror will require strong, effective military forces. A proactive, flexible and robust Security Assistance program is absolutely essential to winning this war.

This paper will focus on the important and ever increasing role Security Assistance must play in support of US national goals and objectives in this new age of terror. It will further define the components which comprise Security Assistance, discuss some of the inherent risks and benefits associated with it, compare regional Security Assistance priorities, discuss the political ramifications associated with it and offer analysis and conclusions concerning policy implementation.

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SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN AN AGE OF TERROR

The enemies of liberty and our country should make no mistake: America remains engaged in the world by history and by choice, shaping a balance of power that favors freedom. We will protect our allies and our interests. We will show purpose without arrogance. We will meet aggression and bad faith with resolve and strength. And to all nations, we will speak for the values that gave our nation birth.

—President George W. Bush, Inaugural Address, January 20, 2001

And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime...

We will not tire, we will not falter and we will not fail.

—President George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress,
September 20, 2001

September 11, 2001 - A day that will forever live in infamy. Over 3000 innocent people died that day when terrorist directed airplanes crashed into the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon in DC and into the ground in rural Western Pennsylvania. These premeditated and savage attacks jolted the United States to its core. No longer could the US claim its borders were safe from the scourge of terrorism. Terrorists had proven they were ready, able and willing to carry their fight to the US. In response to this heinous attack, America moved swiftly to protect and defend itself. America's armed forces were placed on alert within its own borders and around the world, National Guard troops were called to duty to protect critical transportation nodes, nuclear power facilities, government buildings, and other highly visible, symbolic targets. The president established the Office of Homeland Security to oversee the security of America's borders. This unprecedented action marked the end of an era. America had entered a new age, an age of terror warfare of the 21st century.

The president has requested a \$48 billion increase in the FY 2003 defense budget to shore up Homeland Security.¹ This money will be used to increase and improve the security posture of America against those who want to do her harm. Protection of America's borders and citizens is of paramount importance and this budget increase is necessary and appropriate. However, building a Fortress America will not, by itself, provide complete protection for US

citizens. The US also must work to eliminate the sources of terror. Accomplishing this mission will be no easy task. It, too, will require significant amounts of money and the support of a large anti-terror coalition of nations. US national security depends on the accomplishment of both of these objectives.

In its desire to defend America proper, the US must not lose sight of the importance of a global national security strategy against terror. Terror has no national limitations or boundaries. It is not bound by geography. It can originate from all regions of the globe. Any global national security strategy must augment and complement the efforts made at home. For this reason, it is imperative the US reassess its foreign policy strategy with all nations on earth. This strategy must take a new look at where terror resides and how to get at it. It must look at all regions and enlist the willing support of all nations to eliminate this deadly enemy. The US must open the lines of communications and identify those nations or regions where terror is most likely to emanate. Using all elements of national power, it must then seek the cooperation of those nations in the war on terror.

The US has a wide range of tools at its disposal to cement foreign cooperative relationships. However, none are more relevant or useful than the Security Assistance program. I believe this program is the linchpin to garnering foreign support for the US led war on terror. The various and sundry elements of this program can effectively tilt neutral nations toward the US and strengthen relationships with nations that are already friendly toward the US. It is a program that furthers US strategic interests by promoting democratic values, human rights, diplomatic and military partnerships, regional stability, interoperability and access into previously inaccessible locales, and dissuades our enemies from taking aggressive military actions. Fighting the war on terror will require strong, effective military forces. A proactive, flexible and robust Security Assistance program is absolutely essential to winning this war. However, it is also essential to continue the gains made with this program once the war on terror is won.

This paper will focus on the important and ever increasing role Security Assistance must play in support of US national goals and objectives in this new age of terror. It will further define the components which comprise Security Assistance. Additionally, it will discuss some of the inherent risks and benefits associated with it, compare regional Security Assistance priorities,

discuss the political ramifications associated with it and offer analysis and conclusions concerning policy implementation.

FOREIGN POLICY, TERROR AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE

At various times during the Twentieth Century, US foreign policy has been described as ineffective, inconsistent, imperialistic, contradictory, erratic and confrontational.² It has been demonized and ridiculed. At times, it has aroused the anger of many governments around the world. Despite all this, US foreign policy has always been driven by one overriding principle which can not and should not ever be compromised: The best interests of the US. This inviolate principle underwrites the formulation, implementation and execution of all US foreign policy decisions. In December 2000, the US published its most current document detailing US national security strategy entitled A National Security Strategy for a Global Age. It not only reinforced the pursuit of national interests, it also discussed the importance of values. It stated US foreign policy "must reflect two guiding principles that influence both our national character and legacy: protecting our national interests and advancing our values."³ In concert with these principles, this document also declared the US would pursue the following three goals: "enhancing security at home and abroad, promoting prosperity, and promoting democracy and human rights."⁴

Certain events can provide the impetus for clear sighted foreign policy. Foreign policy which was described as incoherent or ineffectual can suddenly become coherent and effective when it is clearly articulated and the cause is just. A clearly defined foreign policy can not only galvanize US support for a cause, it can also galvanize worldwide support. The attack on the United States on September 11, 2001 did just that. No other event in the last 50 years brought the US and the rest of the world together like these heinous terrorist atrocities. US foreign policy was quickly summed up in just a few words; "we will direct every resource at our command, every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war, to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network."⁵ However, it takes more than just a policy paper or a well written speech to turn policy into reality. It takes concrete action and a steady resolve. It takes a willingness to use all elements of national power, diplomatic, economic, informational and military, to achieve the stated policy goals and objectives. Above all, it takes a willingness to stay the course, despite the loss of life or national treasure.

President Bush has stated the US will go after all terrorist organizations with global reach and those nations that harbor terrorists. But, this is no easy task and the US will not be able to go it alone. It will take a large coalition of nations to successfully accomplish this monumental mission. As the world's sole superpower, the US must rally all nations to this cause. It must win over their hearts and minds and remind all that defeating and destroying terror is the right thing to do. It is especially important the US do this with nations which have never been strong US allies. It must be the strategy of the US to unite the coalition forces against terrorism *for the long haul* and lead the effort.

It will also take a great deal of money to successfully fight and win the war on terror. Not only must the US properly arm and equip herself, it must arm and equip its coalition partners...and there will be many partners. This war will require the steady support and cooperation of all peace loving nations on earth. However, all nations do not have the means to root out terror - even within their own borders. They lack the necessary military capabilities which are so critical to winning this war. The US can and must assist these countries by providing them the military strength they require to combat terror. The US must also beef up the military capabilities of its long time friends and allies to assist it in its hunt for terrorists. Providing increased military capabilities to *all* coalition forces may make some uneasy, but it must be done. The US Security Assistance program is the means to make this happen. Without a doubt, it will play the pivotal role in preparing the coalition for a long and protracted war.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE DEFINED

Security Assistance is a subset of both the diplomatic and military instruments of power. It is an integral arm of US national security strategy and has served to further US national interests for many, many years. This program, which is defined and described below, has greatly contributed to achieving past US goals and objectives. The events of September 11 under-scores the need for a Security Assistance program which can also secure future goals and objectives...one of which is rooting out terror and those who harbor terrorists. A robust, forward looking Security Assistance program can spell the difference between success and failure in the war on terror. The US needs to ensure the full potential of this program is brought to bear on those terrorist organizations which seek to do harm to the US.

Because the term "Security Assistance" has been bandied about for many years, it has been defined in many different ways. It has been called International Assistance, Collective Security, Military Assistance, International Defense Cooperation and more recently, Security Cooperation. These terms have become to be used somewhat interchangeably and in many ways are synonymous. However, for this paper, Security Assistance is defined as "Groups of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense related services, by grant, loan, credit or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives."⁶

A National Security Strategy for a Global Age strongly supports the continued use of a comprehensive Security Assistance policy. "Through overseas presence and peacetime engagement activities, such as defense cooperation, security assistance, centers for security studies, training, and exercises with allies and friends, our Armed Forces help to deter aggression and coercion, build coalitions, promote regional stability...and serve as role models for militaries in emerging democracies."⁷ This document then declares "With countries that are neither staunch friends or known foes, military cooperation can serve as a positive means of building bridges between the military leaderships of different nations."⁸ Fighting a war on terror absolutely requires the building of these bridges. The Security Assistance program is the means to do just that. But, we must build these bridges proactively. We can not wait for the next round of terrorist strikes to begin to think about where to build bridges next. The US must extend the hand of friendship, through the Security Assistance program, to those areas of the world where we have neither "staunch friends or known foes." By developing good relations with these countries early on, the chance of enlisting their aid in the war on terror is greatly improved.

The Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR), dated September 30, 2001, complements the policy stated in the National Security Strategy and its Security Assistance viewpoint. The QDR states "the US military will promote security cooperation with allies and friendly nations. A primary objective of US security cooperation will be to help allies and friends create favorable balances of military power in critical areas of the world to deter aggression or coercion."⁹ This is fine so far as it goes, but we are now living in an age where we must fight a new and different kind of war. Therefore, this policy must go further. It must also declare US willingness to explore security cooperation with countries who are not considered friends or

allies, but who are not considered enemies either. Establishing a dialogue with these countries, can lead to a warmer, more cordial relationship which can only enhance US national security interests. Establishing these ties now, will go a long way toward ensuring "access, interoperability, and intelligence cooperation, while expanding the range of preconflict options to counter threats, deter aggression, or favorably prosecute war on US terms."¹⁰

Security Assistance has long played a critical role in shaping and molding US national security strategy. Now more than ever, it is essential this critically important program remain relevant. It must be flexible enough to change with the times. It must be responsive to the most serious threats. The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 propelled the US and the world into a new and dangerous age. As the world enters the 21st century, terror is the preferred method to wage war. It is now incumbent upon the US to reevaluate the Security Assistance program and maximize its full potential.

KEY COMPONENTS

The Security Assistance program contains a broad range of components which provides the US maximum flexibility when dealing with foreign countries. There are six of these components and all play an active role in promoting US foreign policy. Three components are administered by the Department of Defense; Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP) and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. The remaining three are administered by the Department of State; Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), Economic Support Fund (ESF) and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). Some of these components are highly visible and involve billions of dollars. Others are relatively small and do not receive much funding or scrutiny. Each, in its own way, helps the US further its national security objectives. Additionally, the President has the authority to supplement these programs by authorizing and approving the Lease of defense articles, the sale of Excess Defense Articles, the Emergency Drawdown of defense articles, services and training during crisis situations, and Third-Country Transfers of defense articles.

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) is the system which manages government-to-government military equipment, training and services sales. A Letter of Agreement (LOA) signed by authorized representatives from both countries is the instrument used to consummate the sale. The LOA precisely defines the number and type of defense articles or services being sold and the cost of each. Foreign countries normally pay for these purchases using their own national

funds, although the US does permit financing arrangements. Since the US guarantees all sales of defense articles and services conducted using the Foreign Military Sales process, foreign governments feel very secure purchasing defense articles in this manner. Additionally, the US also offers The Foreign Military Construction Sales (FMCS) program. This is a large sub-element of Foreign Military Sales. Countries seeking to upgrade infrastructure or facilities may purchase design and construction services by using the same procedures required for the Foreign Military Sales program. During FY 2000, the US sold roughly \$9 billion dollars worth of defense articles and services to foreign countries.¹¹

The Foreign Military Financing Program provides selected foreign countries with the means to purchase US defense articles. Funds, in the form of loans or grants, "enable key allies and friends to improve their defense capabilities by financing the acquisition of US military articles, services, and training."¹² This is an extremely important program which could become absolutely essential in building a worldwide coalition for the war on terror. Countries willing to stand with the US against terror should be afforded maximum Foreign Military Financing consideration. The US must not hesitate to use this extremely important diplomatic and military tool. Foreign Military Financing grant and loan money can make a huge difference in the military capabilities of our coalition forces. The US must not squander this opportunity. During FY 2002, the Foreign Military Financing Program helped various countries finance \$3.6 billion in US defense articles.¹³ However, the "vast majority of this money, over 93%, goes to the Middle East (Israel, Egypt and Jordan) to promote regional peace and stability in helping to meet the legitimate security needs of parties engaged in trying to achieve peace in that region."¹⁴ The war on terror requires an immediate reassessment of this program. The US must determine where this money can best be used and if more money is needed for funding. Expanding the Foreign Military Financing Program to all countries willing to fight terror may be exactly what is needed to win this war.

Unlike Foreign Military Sales, Direct Commercial Sales are not backed by the full faith and credit of the US. Although overseen by the Department of State, the US government does not back these sales because it is not a party to the sale. Instead, Direct Commercial Sales are agreements between US defense contractors and foreign governments, foreign contractors or international organizations. Under this arrangement, defense contractors sell defense articles directly to these foreign entities. Of course, prior to any sale, the defense contractor must have received authorization from the US government to sell the requested items to the foreign entity

in question. This authorization is known as an Arms Export Control License. Once a defense contractor is in receipt of an Arms Export Control License, it may conduct the sale. During FY 2000, Direct Commercial Sales to foreign entities amounted to more than \$15 billion.¹⁵

The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program is a foreign policy tool which can prove extremely beneficial to the furtherance of US national security interests. This low cost program “provides training on a grant basis to students from over 130 allied and friendly nations.”¹⁶ The training provided by the US enhances both the professional development and technical skills of foreign students. Additionally, this training exposes students to civilian control of military organizations, the rule of law, respect for civil and human rights and the principles of democratic values. The US reaps tremendous benefits from this program. It not only positively influences foreign governments to the virtues of democracy, it also serves to foster better relationships with foreign countries. In some cases, this may be the only military or diplomatic tool the US can use to engage certain countries. Yet, this small program may be a first step to building strong and lasting cooperative relationships. It may be the one and only reason some countries provide the US with the access it needs to hunt down terrorists. The International Military Education and Training program could be of invaluable assistance to the US in its war on terror. During FY 2002, the US allocated \$65 million to the IMET program.¹⁷ This program must be reassessed and a determination made if it should be expanded to include additional countries – especially those that are teetering in their support for the war on terror. A proactive IMET engagement effort may go a long way to securing that essential support.

The Economic Support Fund (ESF) promotes “economic and political stability in areas where the US has special political and security interests and where the US has determined that economic assistance can be useful in helping to secure peace or to avert major economic or political crisis.”¹⁸ The funding provided is given to selected countries on a grant basis. Currently, the majority of the funding for this program is allocated to the Near East to support ongoing peace initiatives between Israel and her neighbors. However, most regions of the world do receive some assistance. The funding is primarily used to promote democratic institution building, political reform, economic reform, humanitarian and justice programs, regional peace processes, basic education programs and humanitarian assistance. During FY 2002, the US allocated over \$2.3 billion to the Economic Support Fund.¹⁹ The assistance provided by the US to those countries struggling to peacefully coexist with their neighbors, and improve their democratic, economic and social ideals is essential to fulfilling US national

security goals and objectives. Establishing the bonds of friendship with them not only helps to improve their respective circumstances, it also helps provide access to those areas of the world. The Economic Support Fund is a critical means for making this happen. Continued strong economic support and encouragement from the US toward these countries will be required to win the war on terror. The US can not let down its guard or reduce funding in this area. Unstable conditions are a breeding ground for terrorist operations. An expanded use of the Economic Support Fund may well prevent the establishment of terrorist footholds in countries that are most vulnerable.

Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) is the last element in the Security Assistance toolkit. Peacekeeping Operations account objectives include: "promoting regional and global stability by supporting multilateral peacekeeping initiatives; encouraging greater participation of foreign forces in international peacekeeping activities; and leveraging fair-share contributions to peacekeeping efforts from those countries with greater potential to pay, while facilitating increased participation of poorer countries when resource constraints would otherwise prevent it."²⁰ By participating in Peacekeeping Operations, the US seeks to reduce the threat of regional conflict while encouraging peaceful conflict resolution. The US is currently committed to Peacekeeping Operations in Sub-Sahara Africa, the Sinai, the Balkans and East Timor. US involvement in these areas is essential not just to keep the warring parties apart, but to also prevent the spread of terrorism which thrives in chaotic environs. During FY 2002, the US allocated \$150 million to Peacekeeping Operations.²¹ This program also must be reassessed and a determination made if it, too, should be expanded to include additional countries or regions where conflict is prevalent. Peacekeeping Operations provide the US with access to dangerous and unstable locations that are ripe for terrorist cells. Continued participation in Peacekeeping Operations should deny terrorist expansion into areas that otherwise would become fertile ground for terror operations.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE RISKS

The war on terror is too large for the US to rely only on its trusted friends and allies. It must now look to bolster its security by enlisting the aid of countries that previously had not been especially friendly toward the US. This can amount to a considerable degree of risk. But, a proactive and robust Security Assistance program is not without risks. This certainly is not to say the US, in its quest to achieve its national security goals and objectives, should blindly and arbitrarily offer any component of the Security Assistance program to countries who are not

“staunch friends or known foes.” Not at all. The US first must attempt to ascertain the national goals and aspirations of these countries and determine if they are compatible with those of the US. If they are, the US should extend its hand in friendship and work with those countries to establish a cooperative relationship. If not, the US must work diligently to bring them on board to support its point of view. If this fails, the US must then determine if these countries pose a significant threat to US national interests. If they do, then the US must develop an appropriate response.

If the US believes a country is ambivalent in its attitude toward the US, it is risky to offer any form of Security Assistance to that country. But, neither does it mean that the US should write that country off completely. To the contrary, countries espousing this viewpoint must be drawn into a deeper dialogue where a search can begin for common ground. A relatively benign offer of IMET funding or a grant or loan for excess non-lethal military equipment may be a good first step toward closer ties. These initial offers could blossom into a future cordial and friendly relationship. On the other hand, they may not. But, now more than ever before, it is imperative that we find out which countries will tilt toward the US and which will not. The world is embroiled in a war on terror and the US needs to know who it can and can not count on when the chips are down.

Leaders, governments and attitudes all change over time. There are no concrete guarantees the governments which the US has strongly supported through the use of Security Assistance will always be its friend or ally. It is possible a country the US has enthusiastically militarized using all elements of the Security Assistance program, may turn against us. This has happened in the past and it can happen in the future. Between 1950 until the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, the US poured over \$10 billion in sales, grants and loans into Iran.²² Today Iran is a bitter enemy of the US and a harbinger of terrorist groups. The US certainly did not intend to back a loser, but there are no crystal balls. Nobody can see what the future may bring. The US must conduct its foreign policy in the present and use its considerable power and influence to avert similar disasters.

The world is still a very dangerous place. At times, it is difficult for the US to clearly discern friends from foes. As the war on terror heats up, the US must take some risks and back countries who have never been “staunch friends or known enemies.” Many of these countries may not have democratic institutions. Many may have corrupt government officials.

Many may have human rights abuses. Some may even oppose US values. However, if these countries indicate a willingness to support the war on terror, the US must search for ways to enlist their willing support.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE BENEFITS

The benefits of Security Assistance in furthering US national security objectives are undeniable. Many are obvious but some may not be so apparent. During previous discussion, I have already alluded to some of these benefits; access, influence and regional stability. These are the primary objectives of US national security strategy. I have further detailed their significance below.

The US prefers a peaceful world safe for democracy. It prefers a world where all nations are free from tyranny and share prosperity. It prefers a world which reflects the values Americans hold so dear; life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. The US believes strongly in each of these principles and is willing to support other countries struggling to attain them. Providing support in the form of Security Assistance can begin to move struggling countries down the road toward the eventual fulfillment of these principles. In return, the US also moves down the road toward attaining its national security objectives – influence, access and regional stability. With each Security Assistance offer and acceptance, the US gains influence with that country. The influence may or may not be great, but it is there nonetheless. It may be to such an extent that foreign countries follow the lead of the US. This influence can be essential when the US needs foreign support, such as the war on terror. A Security Assistance relationship may also provide the foundation for greater access with another nation. This access may not just take the shape of economic or cultural access, either. It may also include access to transit a nation's borders in hot pursuit of terrorist operatives. Finally, Security Assistance also promotes regional stability. It can balance the military powers in a region and deter aggression. This is essential if the US is to realize its vision of a world free from terror and nations peacefully coexisting with one another.

Additionally, many other mutually beneficial relationships result from Security Assistance cooperation. Some of the more important benefits are detailed below.

Foreign countries struggling to establish a professional officer and NCO corps will no doubt benefit from this program. As a recipient of IMET funding, foreign countries can begin to

instill the professionalism required in their military forces that is essential to good order and discipline. Military leadership must set this example. An improved understanding and encouragement of civil-military relationships, democratic values and ideals, and the rule of law will set the tone for the armed forces. The military leadership must then train and enforce these principles into its ranks. Instilling these values will result in a fighting force the populous can respect and support. As the US leads the effort in the war on terror, it must work with the armed forces of many, many different nations. The US, in concert with other coalition forces, will take the fight to wherever terrorists may lurk. A common understanding of US doctrine and procedures, the rule of law, civilian control of the military and similar principles and values greatly improves the ability of coalition forces to work together for the common good – the eradication of terror.

Modernizing a foreign country's armed forces with US equipment greatly improves the interoperability of US led coalition forces. It also enhances US influence in the country. Through sales, grants, loans or leases, equipping foreign countries with US military hardware ensures the interoperability that is so important for successful military operations. Providing US equipment will also ensure the country fights using US doctrine and procedures. As the war on terror escalates, it is critical the US understand the capabilities each country within the coalition brings to the table. Country's modernized with US military equipment eliminates most of the guesswork.

Modernizing the armed forces of friendly foreign countries provides these countries with the confidence necessary to deal with unfriendly neighbors or internal strife. Combined with professional, technical and tactical training provided through the International Military and Educational Training program, armed forces modernized by the Security Assistance program have the means to apply military force if required. The foreign country benefits because it is prepared to deter aggression, but the US also benefits from this relationship. By modernizing, professionalizing and training the armed forces of foreign countries, the US has given those countries the defensive wherewithal to take care of themselves. Up to a certain point, these countries should be able to fight their own battles. This military capability could well mean the US is not called upon to provide assistance in the form of troops and equipment to support the military actions taken. This strategy will help keep the US out of small internal or external conflicts, reducing the risk to US lives and equipment. It also defuses negative international reaction which frequently follows US involvement in military actions.

Improved economic conditions within a foreign country can directly result from the Security Assistance provided. The result of any co-development, co-production or any other cooperative agreement will include the need for skilled and unskilled laborers, project managers, investments and infrastructure. The establishment of the F16 production facility in Turkey and the M1 tank plant in Egypt are just two examples of Security Assistance cooperation. Hundreds, if not thousands of jobs were created in those two countries as a result of these cooperative agreements. Additionally, the infrastructure within these countries also benefited. The construction of new production facilities, warehouses, laboratories, etc., resulted in significant ancillary improvements in local power generation facilities, water treatment facilities, transportation networks and communications capabilities. Whether these cooperative arrangements are through the use of Foreign Military Sales or Direct Commercial Sales, the bottom line is an improved economy wherever they are built. An improved economy also helps improve the political stability of a country. This in turn helps the US establish a long term and consistent foreign policy with the country.

Economic benefits do not just occur in the foreign countries which are recipients of Security Assistance. Strong Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales also have a significant impact on the health and well being of the US defense industry. By expanding the sale of military equipment and services overseas, the US defense industry not only gains market share, but even more importantly, it provides jobs for thousands of Americans. In fact, overseas sales are increasingly becoming more and more important because US defense needs are simply not adequate to sustain the current defense workforce. It has become apparent to both the US and defense contractors that Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales are key to maintaining and sustaining a strong and vibrant defense industry. During FY 2000, the Foreign Military Sales program sold about \$9 billion worth of military equipment, training and services to countries and organizations around the world. During the same timeframe, US defense contractors racked up more than \$15 billion in foreign sales.²³ Without foreign sales, the economic vitality necessary to keep the defense industry afloat would gradually wither away. This would result in the loss of thousands of jobs and a serious blow to the overall US economy.

The economic benefits achieved by the US due to Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales can not be understated. However, as important as they are, the US achieves

an even more important benefit from these sales. Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales also ensure the preservation of the US defense industrial base. In a national strategic sense, the preservation of the defense industrial base far outweighs the economic benefits generated by these sales. Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales are becoming a larger and larger percentage of the overall defense industry pie. Many in the defense industry depend on foreign requirements to keep their production lines operating. Reduced sales at home or abroad can make the difference between continuing a production line and closing it down, especially when every \$1 billion in sales equals about 35,000 US jobs.²⁴ Unfortunately, if the decision is made to close down the line, there may be no other source to obtain the item. Hence, the US defense industrial base becomes just a little bit smaller, a little bit less flexible and a little bit less responsive. Skilled workers will be left with little choice but to leave this industry and look for jobs elsewhere. This scenario is not conducive to the fight against terror.

The US leads by the "authority that comes from the attractiveness of its values and force of its example, rather than the power of its military might to compel by force or sanction."²⁵ It is not US policy to force a regime change, but the US will never back away from promoting its principles and values. Exposure to the Security Assistance program can result in the genesis of a shift in a foreign country's cultural, social and political ideology. This shift may be slow and gradual, but the Security Assistance program can provide the impetus for change. Continued cooperation and encouragement can go a long way toward assisting a foreign country in its movement toward a democratic society. Security Assistance can in some way, shape or form, influence all aspects of a foreign society, not just the armed forces. Long term Security Assistance cooperation increases the chances for success.

REGIONAL PRIORITIES

Through the use of the Economic Support Fund, Foreign Military Financing Program, International Military Education and Training program and Peacekeeping Operations, the US provided slightly less than \$8 billion in grants and loans to her friends and allies during FY 2000.²⁶ Although \$8 billion dollars sounds like a lot of money, it amounts to less than .5% of the FY 2000 US annual budget of \$1.7 trillion.²⁷ At just over \$6 billion, The FY 2002 budget requested even less Security Assistance funding than that of FY 2000. However, it is certain this amount will significantly increase as the US authorizes supplemental funding to conduct the war on terror. The funding breakout for FY 2003 has yet to be determined.

The chart below depicts a comparison between actual FY 2000 and estimated FY 2002 Security Assistance grants and loans provided to the various regions of the world.²⁸ FY 2001 figures were omitted because actual amounts have not yet been published. Amounts under one billion dollars have been rounded to the nearest million dollars. Amounts over one billion dollars have been rounded to the nearest hundred million dollars.

| REGION | FY 00 ESF | FY 02 ESF | FY00 IMET | FY02 IMET | FY00 FMFP | FY02 FMFP | FY00 PKO | FY02 PKO |
|----------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|
| Africa | \$62M | \$105M | \$7M | \$10M | \$10M | \$19M | \$37M | \$71M |
| East Asia and Pacific | \$96M | \$170M | \$5M | \$6M | \$1M | \$22M | \$8M | \$8M |
| Europe | \$59M | \$39M | \$15M | \$19M | \$54M | \$119M | \$85M | \$55M |
| Near East Asia | \$2.4B | \$1.6B | \$6M | \$7M | \$4.6B | \$3.4B | \$16M | \$16M |
| Former Soviet Union States | \$00* | \$00* | \$5M | \$7M | \$12M | \$21M | \$0M | \$0M |
| South Asia | \$11M | \$30M | \$1M | \$2M | \$0M | \$0M | \$0M | \$0M |
| Western Hemisphere | \$124M | \$170M | \$10M | \$13M | \$3M | \$18M | \$4M | \$0M |
| Other | \$28M | \$91M | \$0M | \$2M | \$33M | \$53M | \$3M | \$0M |
| Grand Totals | \$2.8B | \$2.3B | \$50M | \$65M | \$4.7B | \$3.6B | \$153M | \$153M |

Table 1 – Grants and Loans By Region

With respect to the Economic Support Fund, most regions with the obvious exception of the Near East and Europe, did receive a substantial funding increase. However, when looked at in absolute dollars, funding for the ESF program overall decreased by about \$500 million. This is not conducive for fighting a war on terror. ESF funding is primarily used to assist impoverished areas of the world by reaching out through education, humanitarian and economic programs. The US needs to be reaching out to these impoverished countries with care and compassion, establishing good will in all regions. *Although the Former Soviet Union States did not receive any ESF funding, they are receiving funding through another program known as Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union. This program has provided funding during FY 2000 and FY 2002 in the amounts of \$839 million and \$808 million respectively.²⁹

International Military Education and Training program has increased funding in all regions. This is a good sign. The US must now forecast where the potential for future bases of terror exists and work closely with nations in those regions to firm up military partnerships, education and training relationships.

The Foreign Military Financing Program dropped precipitously between FY2000 and FY2002. This is due to the tremendous decrease in the funding provided to the Near East Asia region. All other regions, however greatly increased their funding allocations. This is a good sign because terror is spreading to all regions and the US must be willing to finance military equipment for nations willing to fight. This is an excellent way for the US to ensure coalition interoperability and access.

Finally, Peacekeeping Operations funding has remained fairly stable at the bottom line level between FY 2000 and FY 2002. The Africa region has shown a substantial increase while the Europe region has shown a corresponding decrease. Because many Peacekeeping Operations are in impoverished and strife-torn regions, it is necessary for the US to promote the search for peace. Failure to lead in these areas, leaves the door open for the roots of terror to take hold. This is not in the best interest of the US. Therefore, the US must remain involved and willing to fund Peacekeeping Operations in all regions.

The recently introduced terror factor has changed everything. The US is now at war against an elusive and well financed enemy. Congress has already taken action to increase the amount of Security Assistance provided, but more is expected.³⁰ Therefore, the final FY 2002 regional dollar breakout will be revised upward when the actual funding expenditures are finally tallied. Afghanistan and most of the countries in the regions of South Asia and the Former Soviet Union States have already received substantial increases in funding. It is also my expectation the FY 2003 Security Assistance regional funding allocations will significantly increase over the final FY 2002 numbers. As the war on terror spreads, many other countries in other regions may also need hefty financial military assistance.

POLITICS AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Politics will always play a role in determining which countries receive Security Assistance. At times, the Executive and Legislative branches of government simply can not reach agreement with respect to a specific country. When these disagreements occur, the Legislative branch can block the sale or funding of military equipment, training or services to a foreign country. Conversely, the Executive branch can also refuse to issue Arms Export Control Licenses for specific equipment to foreign countries supported by the Legislative branch. Battles such as these have occurred in the past and are certain to occur in the future. There are

many reasons for these disagreements, but when all is said and done, politics may be the biggest reason of all. Powerful lobbyists and constituents, foreign country influence, defense contractors and political party members all apply pressure to get what they want. Unfortunately, at times, US national security pays the price.

Cooler heads must prevail. Executive and Congressional leadership must put aside petty partisan politics to do whatever is in the best interests of the US to successfully prosecute this war. In his 2003 defense budget testimony, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld lamented the ongoing bickering between the two branches. He said, "Mr. Chairman, I don't know quite how it happened, but over the past two decades, distrust seems to have developed between the Congress and the Executive Branch. Possibly the Executive Branch did some things that caused distrust in the Congress, and the Congress has, for whatever reasons, decided that they want to try to micromanage the Department by putting literally thousands of earmarks on the legislation. We need to find a compromise."³¹ For the sake of this nation's national security, both Branches need to work overtime to restore amicable lines of communication. They must reestablish trust and confidence in one another and project a united front in the war on terror.

Unfortunately, politics can rarely be avoided in Washington, DC. It is embedded in almost every issue and every decision. Despite their disagreements, both branches of government must be mindful that US Homeland Security can not start at the American shoreline. It must start overseas, in the regions where terrorist networks reside. By extending its security umbrella outward, the US provides maximum defense of its borders. This strategy is expensive, however Congress and the President must not hesitate to provide this essential funding. Our friends, allies and coalition anti-terror forces provide the US with defense in depth. These "preventive efforts, such as active diplomatic and military engagement...and bolstering allies' political and security capabilities, require strong financial support in order to squeeze terrorists before they act. Providing political support and economic assistance to front line states and other allies impacted by this threat expands the circle of nations fighting against threats to the United States. These preventive measures are an important partner to our counterterrorism response efforts."³² Partisan politics has no place here. Both Congress and the President must agree to provide Security Assistance to all nations willing to fight terror.

To date, the war against terror has received solid support from both the Executive and Legislative branches. Congress has overwhelmingly concurred with the president's call for

increased Homeland Security funding for this war. However, concerns regarding the use of Security Assistance are sure to rise over time. As I mentioned previously, the US may try to recruit some countries in the fight against terror that do not uphold the best traditions of democratic society. Some may be oppressive toward their own countrymen. Some may not have a stellar human rights record. Some may have allied themselves with enemies of the US in the past. Some may have no interest in expanding the freedoms and liberties accorded their citizens. Some may have no intention of changing their ways. In some cases, all these charges may be true. If they are, the US must look at the bigger picture and determine if countries with these records who have indicated a willingness to join the anti-terror coalition forces, should receive US funded Security Assistance. Does the US compromise its position concerning democratic values and principles in exchange for the support of certain countries? If it is determined that support from certain countries is key to rooting out and destroying terror, then the US has no other choice but to enter into a cooperative relationship with those countries. The scourge of terror is the number one threat to the US at this time and the US must do what it can to eradicate it.

The issue of Security Assistance has so many interested parties it is very safe to say political debate over its use is not likely to go away...even in times of war. Politicians are not just concerned with what the US intends to sell or to whom the US intends to sell military goods. Politicians are also concerned with the vast amounts of money used to fund the Department of Defense. Of even greater concern to some are the billions of dollars allocated to fund the various components of the Security Assistance programs. Some believe the money funding Security Assistance may be better spent in the US - and not just toward US defense programs. Or, they make the case this money could be better used funding domestic priorities such as health care, unemployment insurance benefits, job training programs, education and many others.

Senate majority leader Tom Daschle, D-SD, stated "We are not only funding a war against terror, we are also fighting a recession. We need to move forward with help for unemployed workers, affordable prescription drugs for seniors, greater protections against employer mismanagement of employee pensions and the whole host of challenges Americans face."³³ Others are concerned with budget deficits. House budget committee chairman Jim Nussle, R-IO said tough choices must be made. "If those tough choices are not made, we will be setting ourselves up to return to budgets with deficits as far as the eye can see."³⁴ The simple fact of

the matter is there will never be enough money in the US annual budget to satisfy every need, real or perceived. There is only a finite amount of money to be spent and it must be allocated where it is most needed. The war on terror is this nation's top priority.³⁵ Appropriate funding levels for the execution of this war, both at home and abroad, are essential to protect US citizens, strengthen US and coalition military forces and defeat terror around the world.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

The US can not adequately protect itself from terror attacks if it only works to combat terror within its own borders. It must extend its protective zone beyond its shores. It must invest in preventative measures outside its borders to prevent the threat of terror from reaching the homeland. These preventative measures are best accomplished through the use of Security Assistance. By training, educating and arming our coalition friends, the US establishes a strategy of defense in depth. Terror will not be able to hide anywhere. It will not be able to deliberately plan its next attack. It will be constantly on the move, looking for a safe haven, trying to avoid annihilation.

Fighting terror beyond its borders requires the formation of solid partnerships with other like-minded nations. The US must enlist nations from all regions of the globe to establish a strong and ready anti-terror coalition willing to fight and defeat terror. This effort is well underway. "Twenty-seven coalition partners now work together at the United States Central Command Headquarters in Tampa, and sixteen nations serve side by side in the theater. Another 66 nations have contributed various forms of support throughout the campaign."³⁶ More partners are needed. The world can not simply wish terror away. It must be decisively defeated. To accomplish this very difficult task will require the military might and dogged determination of all coalition partners. The US must lead this effort and judiciously use all national elements of power to see this war to a successful conclusion. A robust, flexible and responsive Security Assistance program is the key driver to making this happen.

The war on terror has caused wholesale changes in US foreign policy strategy toward selected countries. Countries which have previously demonstrated undesirable behavior and have been at odds with the US have been welcomed into the anti-terror coalition. India and Pakistan are two prime examples. Because of their ambitious development of nuclear weapons, the US sanctioned both countries in 1990. These sanctions "prohibited American military assistance and arms sales."³⁷ Then, in October 1999, Pakistan's democratically elected

government was overthrown in a military coup. General Pervez Musharraf seized power. The US protested this power grab in strong unambiguous language and urged a "prompt return to civilian rule and restoration of the democratic process."³⁸ This did not happen. General Musharraf was still in power two years later when the terrorist attacks on the US occurred. Because of his willingness to join the US led coalition and throw his support behind the coalition forces, the US immediately lifted the 1990 sanctions and began supplying military assistance and arms to Pakistan. Sanctions were also lifted against India as well. Although the US was not happy with the nuclear arms development programs in South Asia and General Musharraf's illegitimate rise to power, Both Pakistan and India support for the war on terror are of higher national interest. Therefore, the US adjusted its foreign policy strategy to enlist their willing support. Based on this model, the US should continue to look for additional countries to enlist in this struggle. Selective use of Security Assistance could be the means to bring them on board.

Providing coalition forces with the equipment necessary to defeat terror is key to victory. Therefore, the US must maintain and sustain a strong, talented defense industrial base and a talented and skilled workforce to respond to terror. The defense base must remain vibrant and strong, continuously developing the technology that is so critical to tracking and destroying terrorists and terrorist bases. Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales will help prevent the further downsizing and erosion of the US defense industrial base. However, the US must carefully monitor all sales, foreign and domestic, and remain alert for warning signs that indicate economic trouble in a particular defense sector. It must be ready to step in whenever necessary to avert the loss of critical defense capabilities which could affect US strategic defense needs.

The US is hard at work identifying where the war on terror will take it next. Those who are in the terror line of fire must be the first to receive US assistance. Therefore, it is imperative the US identifies the bases for terror by region and work closely with other countries in those regions to stamp it out. The Philippines, Somalia, Yemen, Malaysia, Indonesia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan all are struggling in their respective battles against terror.³⁹ US Security Assistance will greatly improve their efforts to defeat it. However, there are other nations who apparently choose to embrace and sponsor terror. The most formidable of these regimes, North Korea, Iran and Iraq, have been given fair warning to keep their terrorist tendencies in check. In his State of the Union Address, President Bush declared, "The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive

weapons.”⁴⁰ The State Department has also identified Syria, Libya, Cuba and the Sudan as rogue states that sponsor terrorist activities as well.⁴¹ For the moment, terrorist organizations appear to have found a safe haven with all these regimes. As harborers of terrorists, these nations have been put on notice. The US will hold them accountable for any terror attacks that emanate from their borders. The US must continue to isolate them from the world community and offer Security Assistance to all nations in those regions willing to oppose terror. Additionally, the US has publicly identified over 153 terrorists and terrorist organizations and frozen all US based financial assets belonging to them.⁴² Armed with this information, the US must allocate the preponderance of any Security Assistance grant or loan monies to countries in those regions that are willing to stand with the US in its fight against terror. Grant or loans given to willing participants in the war on terror will serve to tighten the noose on terror enclaves.

In the war on terror, no price is too high.⁴³ In his FY 2003 defense budget testimony, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated the budget includes \$19.4 billion for the war on terror.⁴⁴ Although detailed breakout of this money has not been determined, increased Security Assistance funding is a must. As of Dec 21, 2001, the US has already supplied Afghan forces and citizens with more than \$187 million in unforecasted military and humanitarian assistance.⁴⁵ Additionally, the US is moving rapidly to secure cooperative infrastructure improvement arrangements with key nations in close proximity to Afghanistan; Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. To date, it has authorized “\$100 million to pay states bordering Afghanistan for troop support. Moreover, that money is only a beginning...”⁴⁶ Arrangements such as these must also be considered with other countries in all regions if it will help enlist their support for the war on terror.

The US must remain especially alert to those areas of the world where terror seems to gain its strongest footholds. Regions where poverty, oppression, lawlessness and hopelessness intersect are breeding grounds for terrorists. There are numerous regions around the globe where these conditions exist. In addition to those areas mentioned above, the tri-border territory between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay and remote areas within Africa require close scrutiny and all the help we can give to the lawful governments trying to eradicate it. In each region where terror exists, the US must carefully observe and take proactive preventative anti-terror measures. These measures can be assistance through the Economic Support Fund, IMET, PKO or through military sales or financing. Supporting all coalition governments will help give them the means to attack terror where it hides and track it down. The bottom line is the US

must redouble its efforts to gain access, influence and insight into what is happening in all regions of the world.

To date, the coalition war on terror has scored some early successes, but as the president has frequently stated, the war is far from over. Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan have been driven from their strongholds of power and are on the run. It appears they have been defeated, but the coalition forces can not yet claim complete and total victory. Large numbers of terrorists are reported to have fled to cave complexes in the mountains of Afghanistan. US support, in the form of military assistance to Afghan Forces and to the surrounding nations made all the difference in the prosecution of the war in Afghanistan. This assistance provided the means necessary for the Afghan Forces to defeat the terrorists and it also provided the US with desperately needed access into the region. Without this critical component of US diplomatic and military power, the war against terror may have taken on a completely different strategy...one that may have involved a forced entry into the region against the wishes of most of the participants. This would have been disastrous. Instead, the US obtained the willing cooperation of all nations in the region. Without question, the Security Assistance program provided the means.

As the war on terror progresses, it is imperative the US expand the use of the Security Assistance program to its maximum potential. This program truly promotes US national security interests by promoting democratic values, human rights, diplomatic and military partnerships, regional stability, interoperability, influence and access. It is the nexus for increased coalition power and the means to support a broad international war effort. It must be adequately funded so it can provide the training, education and military equipment to our anti-terror coalition partners. The US must look at this funding as a frontline investment in the war on terror. As President Bush stated, "America is no longer protected by vast oceans. We are protected from attack only by vigorous action abroad, and increased vigilance at home."⁴⁷ Providing Security Assistance to our friends, allies and coalition forces is part of the "vigorous action abroad" the president has discussed. It truly is this nation's first line of defense. It ensures the war on terror will be fought far from our borders – thus increasing US Homeland Security. The US has had tremendous success with this program. Its continued use will ensure freedom's victory in the war on terror.

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ENDNOTES

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³William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a Global Age (Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 2000), 4.

⁴*Ibid.*, 1.

⁵George W. Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 37, (24 September 2001): 1349.

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⁷Clinton, 16.

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹Donald H. Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington D.C.: The Pentagon, September 30, 2001), 11.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 20.

¹¹Department of State, "FY 2002 International Affairs (Function 150) Budget Request Account Tables," 9 April 2001; available from <http://www.state.gov/s/rpp/rls/iab/index.cfm>; Internet; accessed 2 October 2001.

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¹⁷Department of State, "FY 2002 International Affairs (Function 150) Budget Request Account Tables."

¹⁸Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, 62.

¹⁹Department of State, "FY 2002 International Affairs (Function 150) Budget Request Account Tables."

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²²Department of Defense, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts, Defense Security Assistance Agency (Washington D.C.: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 30 September 2000), 2, 12, 18, 36, 64, 80, 96, 100, 106.

²³Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, 61.

²⁴Hunter Keeter, "Gov't Should Strengthen Support for FMS, Army Official Says," Defense Daily, 9 July 1999, Vol. 203, Issue: 6 [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 12 January 2002.

²⁵Clinton, 67.

²⁶Department of State, "FY 2002 International Affairs (Function 150) Budget Request Account Tables."

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³⁰Lisa Burgess, "Critics Say Allies Should Be Footing More of the Bill in War on Terrorism," 8 February 2002; available from <http://www.stripesonline.com/article.asp?section=104&article=6650>; Internet; accessed 8 February 2002.

³¹Rumsfeld, "2003 Defense Budget Testimony."

³²Clinton, 23.

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³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Paul Wolfowitz, "Munich Conference on European Security Policy," 2 February 2002; available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020202-depsecdef1.html>; Internet; accessed 8 February 2002.

³⁷Steven Lee Myers, "Congress Expands Choices on Punishing Pakistan," The New York Times, 14 October 1999, p. 12 [database on-line]; available from ProQuest, accessed 12 January 2002.

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